Bolivia’s 2–0 defeat to Paraguay at Audi Field in Washington, D.C., on September 27, 2026, gave Óscar Villegas a useful assessment of the work ahead. Miguel Almirón scored in the 17th and 48th minutes, punishing La Verde on either side of halftime in a friendly that exposed problems in both penalty areas. The official match record confirms the score and the timing of both goals.
The result leaves Bolivia with three practical priorities before its next qualifying campaign: protect central spaces more effectively, create more reliable routes into the penalty area and give emerging players clearly defined responsibilities.
One friendly cannot establish whether an entire coaching project is succeeding. It can expose situations that deserve immediate attention. Against Paraguay, Bolivia faced a familiar football problem: pursuing an equalizer becomes much harder when possession produces limited danger and an opponent can exploit the spaces left behind.
Bolivia’s Defensive Review Must Start Before The Final Shot
The opening goal offers a useful starting point for Villegas and his staff. Diego Gómez delivered an aerial pass into the area, Robert Morales headed the ball toward the penalty spot and Almirón arrived to finish. EFE’s match report describes a coordinated move involving a provider, a target and a runner. Infobae
That sequence suggests Bolivia’s review should extend beyond the defender closest to Almirón. The staff should examine pressure on the initial pass, the contest for the header and the tracking of the arriving attacker.
Each action requires a different response. A midfielder can limit the passer’s time. A defender can challenge the target forward. Another player must recognize the run into the space created by that duel.
The lesson is about shared responsibility. Winning the first aerial ball is valuable, but a defensive structure must remain functional when that contest is lost. Bolivia needs players positioned to defend the next touch.
Training exercises built around crosses, knockdowns and delayed runs would offer a direct response. The objective should be to make the penalty area less vulnerable to an attacker arriving after defenders have turned their attention toward the ball.
The Second Goal Raises Questions About Transition Defense
Almirón’s second goal came just three minutes into the second half. ABC Color’s match analysis describes a counterattack involving a recovery by Maurício, a quick connection through Robert Morales and Julio Enciso, and Almirón’s run into the left side of the area.
For Villegas, the coaching question is how Bolivia should be positioned before possession changes hands.
Sending more players forward can improve attacking options, but someone must protect the central passing route behind them. Bolivia should establish clear rules for which midfielder holds position, when a defender can step forward and who covers the space that movement leaves.
The player nearest a turnover does not always need to win the ball immediately. Delaying the next pass can give teammates time to recover. A rushed challenge that allows an opponent to turn may make the situation worse.
The timing deserves attention, too. Bolivia entered the second half one goal behind and quickly faced a two-goal deficit. The staff should examine whether the team’s attacking intentions after the interval were matched by adequate defensive cover.
This is a proposed area for correction, rather than proof that one positional adjustment would have prevented the goal. The broader aim is to make Bolivia harder to attack when its own move breaks down.
Possession Needs A Clearer Route Into The Penalty Area
Bolivia’s attacking assessment should distinguish time on the ball from meaningful control. EFE reported that Paraguay conceded possession after establishing its advantage, with La Verde struggling to progress through the final attacking zones.
That context matters. A team protecting a lead may accept passes in front of its defensive line. Those passes become threatening when they move defenders, create an overload or release a player behind the block.
Villegas could build around a small number of repeatable combinations. One option is a forward dropping toward midfield as a teammate runs beyond him. Another is a wide player receiving with support close enough to exchange passes and reach the byline.
The movements must complement each other. If several players approach the ball together, Bolivia may gain passing options but lose depth. If everyone runs forward, the player in possession may have no safe connection.
The most useful attacking improvement would be a clearer relationship between the passer, the supporting player and the runner. That would give Bolivia more ways to reach scoring positions without requiring an individual to beat multiple defenders.
Miguel Terceros Needs Support Beyond The Penalty Spot
Miguel Terceros had a chance to reduce the deficit in the 75th minute. Gastón Olveira touched his penalty onto the post, keeping Paraguay’s two-goal advantage intact, as documented in Opinión’s match report.
The missed penalty was a significant moment, but it should not become the entire explanation for Bolivia’s defeat. Converting it would have changed the closing stages. It would not have resolved the earlier defensive errors or established a consistent supply of chances.
For Terceros, the tactical priority should be receiving the ball in positions where he has several useful choices. Close support can offer a quick combination. A run beyond the defense can open room to carry the ball. An overlapping teammate can force an opposing defender to make a decision.
Penalty preparation still merits routine attention: a clear order of takers, consistent practice and preparation for rebounds. Broader attacking work should focus on producing opportunities before Bolivia reaches a moment that demands one decisive kick.
Halftime Changes Should Inform Selection Decisions
Villegas introduced Ramiro Vaca and Jesús Maraude at halftime, replacing Carlos Melgar and Fernando Nava. Those substitutions are recorded by the Paraguayan Football Association.
The next step is to assess what each player contributed within a specific role. Vaca’s evaluation should include his ability to connect midfield and attack. Maraude’s should examine movement, decisions under pressure and his contribution when Bolivia loses possession.
A promising appearance deserves further examination across different match situations. Starting against an organized defense presents a different challenge from entering after the opponent has taken the lead.
The principle connects with NoticiasBo’s coverage of youth soccer pathways: repeated observation in competitive settings provides a stronger basis for evaluation than a single impression.
For Bolivia, that means giving developing players understandable assignments and enough continuity to show whether they can execute them. Selection should reward repeatable contributions, with clear feedback about what needs to improve.
What Villegas Should Measure Before Qualifying
Bolivia’s next evaluations should extend beyond the score. The staff could track how often the team reaches the penalty area through coordinated play, how many attacks end with supported rather than isolated forwards and how frequently opponents advance directly after a turnover.
Those are proposed measures, not statistics established by this match. Their value would come from applying the same definitions across several games.
The review should preserve evidence of productive attacking play. ABC Color’s account describes an early Terceros-to-Gabriel Villamil combination that forced a save, plus a later effort from Vaca that Olveira stopped. Those sequences give the coaching staff material to study alongside the failures.
Villegas should look for the conditions that made those attacks work: the speed of the connection, the receiving position and the support around the ball. Reproducing useful combinations would offer more lasting progress than simply demanding greater finishing accuracy.
Before the next qualifying campaign, Bolivia needs clearer defensive assignments, more connected attacking movement and selection decisions supported by repeated performances. The Paraguay defeat provides specific situations to address. The next test is whether those corrections remain visible when opponents apply pressure and the score becomes uncomfortable.